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Abstract
Adversarial attack of CNN aims at deceiving models to
misbehave by adding imperceptible perturbations to im-
ages. This feature facilitates to understand neural networks
deeply and to improve the robustness of deep learning mod-
els. Although several works have focused on attacking im-
age classifiers and object detectors, an effective and ef-
ficient method for attacking single object trackers of any
target in a model-free way remains lacking. In this pa-
per, a cooling-shrinking attack method is proposed to de-
ceive state-of-the-art SiameseRPN-based trackers. An ef-
fective and efficient perturbation generator is trained with
a carefully designed adversarial loss, which can simulta-
neously cool hot regions where the target exists on the
heatmaps and force the predicted bounding box to shrink,
making the tracked target invisible to trackers. Numerous
experiments on OTB100, VOT2018, and LaSOT datasets
show that our method can effectively fool the state-of-the-
art SiameseRPN++ tracker by adding small perturbations
to the template or the search regions. Besides, our method
has good transferability and is able to deceive other top-
performance trackers such as DaSiamRPN, DaSiamRPN-
UpdateNet, and DiMP. The source codes are available at
https://github.com/MasterBin-IIAU/CSA.
1. Introduction
Online single object tracking is a fundamental task
in computer vision and has many important applica-
tions including intelligent surveillance, autonomous driv-
ing, human-machine interaction, to name a few. In re-
cent years, as deep learning matures and large-scale track-
ing datasets [18, 7, 12] are introduced, the single object
tracking field has developed rapidly. Current state-of-
the-art trackers [16, 40, 15, 8, 17, 6, 3] can be grouped
into two categories: deep discriminative trackers [6, 3, 4],
and SiameseRPN-based trackers [16, 40, 39, 15]. Deep
∗Corresponding Author: Dr. Dong Wang, wdice@dlut.edu.cn
discriminative trackers decompose tracking into two sub-
problems: classification and state estimation. The first one
is solved by an online-learning classifier and the second
one is achieved by maximizing the overlap between can-
didates and the ground truth. SiameseRPN-based trackers
formulate tracking as a one-shot detection problem, locat-
ing objects that have similar appearance with the initial tem-
plate on the search region in each frame. Considering their
balance between accuracy and speed, SiameseRPN-series
trackers have attracted more attention than deep discrimina-
tive trackers.
Adversarial attack is originated from [29], which has
shown that state-of-the-art deep learning models can be
fooled by adding small perturbations to original images.
Research on adversarial attack is beneficial to understand
deep neural networks and design robust models. Pop-
ular adversarial attack methods can be roughly summa-
rized into two categories: iterative-optimization-based and
deep-network-based attacks. The former method [9, 21,
35] applies many times of gradient ascent to maximize
an adversarial objective function for deceiving deep net-
works and is usually time-consuming. However, the latter
one [34, 31] applies tremendous data to train an adversar-
ial perturbation-generator. The latter method is faster than
the former method because only one-time forward propaga-
tion is needed for each attack after training. In recent years,
adversarial attack has become a popular topic and has ex-
tended from image classification to more challenging tasks,
such as object detection [35, 31] and semantic segmenta-
tion [35].
However, an effective and efficient adversarial attack
method for single object tracking remains lacking. In
this study, we choose the state-of-the-art SiamRPN++ [15]
tracker as our main research object and propose a novel
cooling-shrinking attack method. This method learns an
efficient perturbation generator to make the tracker fail by
simultaneously cooling down hot regions where the target
exists on the heatmaps and forcing the predicted bounding
box to shrink during online tracking. Our main contribution
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can be summarized as follows.
• A novel and efficient cooling-shrinking attack method
is proposed to effectively fool the SiamRPN++ tracker.
Experiments on OTB100 [33], VOT2018 [14], and La-
SOT [7] show that our method can successfully deceive
the state-of-the-art SiamRPN++ tracker.
• Numerous experiments show that a discriminator is
unnecessary in this task because existing L2 loss and
fooling loss have already achieved our goal.
• Our attacking method has good transferability. Exper-
imental results demonstrate that state-of-the-art track-
ers (such as DaSiamRPN and DiMP) can also be de-
ceived by our method, even though this method is not
specially designed for them.
2. Related Works
2.1. Single Object Tracking
Given the tracked target in the first frame, single object
tracking (SOT) aims at capturing the location of the target
in the subsequent frames. Different from object detection
that recognizes objects of predefined categories, the SOT
task belongs to one-shot learning, requiring trackers to be
capable of tracking any possible targets. Efficient and ro-
bust trackers are difficult to be designed because of chal-
lenges, such as occlusion, similar distractors, deformation,
and motion blur, during tracking. Recently, with the pros-
perity of deep learning and the introduction of large-scale
object tracking datasets [7, 12], the study of SOT has un-
dergone a rapid development. Currently, state-of-the-art
trackers can be divided into two categories. One is based
on SiamRPN (including SiamRPN [16], DaSiamRPN [40],
SiamRPN+ [39], SiamRPN++ [15], and SiamMask [30]),
and the other is based on deep discriminative models (in-
cluding ATOM [6] and DiMP [3]).
SiamRPN [16] formulates SOT as a one-shot detection
problem and is the first attempt to introduce RPN [24] in
the tracking filed. With the help of RPN, SiamRPN removes
heavy multi-scale correlation operations, running at a high
speed and producing accurate results. DaSiamRPN [40] re-
lieves the SiamRPN’s weakness of being susceptible to dis-
tractors, by introducing challenging samples to the training
set. However, the negative effect of image padding makes
SiamRPN and DaSiamRPN only apply the shallow and
padding-free AlexNet’s variant as their backbone, which
does not fully take advantage of the capability of modern
deep neural networks [28, 10]. To overcome this prob-
lem, some studies have proposed the addition of a cropping-
inside residual unit and a spatial-aware sampling strategy in
SiamRPN+ [39] and SiamRPN++ [15]. These works relieve
the center bias problem caused by image padding, mak-
ing the SiameseRPN framework benefit from modern back-
bones and significantly improving the Siamese tracker’s
performance. SiamMask [30] proposes a unified framework
for visual object tracking and semi-supervised video object
segmentation, further increasing the accuracy of predicted
bounding boxes.
ATOM [6] proposes a tracking framework composed
of the dedicated target estimation and classification com-
ponents. The target estimation module is an IOU-Net’s
variant [13] that can produce an accurate bounding box
of the target, given the initial appearance information.
DiMP [3] inherits the ATOM’s framework (making it end-
to-end trainable) and proposes a more discriminative model
predictor. DiMP achieves state-of-the-art performance on
most tracking benchmarks, thereby serving a strong base-
line in the tracking community.
2.2. Adversarial Attack
The adversarial attack in [29] indicates that CNN is
highly vulnerable to attack and state-of-the-art classifiers
can be easily fooled by adding visually imperceptible noises
to original images. Since then, several works have focused
on adversarial attacks. Early works [9, 21, 35, 34, 31] add
perturbations in the digital world, directly changing pixel
values which are fed into the networks. Latter works fo-
cus on creating physical adversarial objects, such as eye-
glasses [26], posters [32], and animals [1], in the real world,
further broadening the influence of adversarial attacks.
Digitally adversarial attack methods can be roughly di-
vided into two categories: iterative-optimization-based and
deep-network-based algorithms. The former ones (includ-
ing FGSM [9], Deepfool [21], and DAG [35]) optimize an
adversarial objective function to fool deep networks and are
usually time-consuming due to several iterations. However,
deep-network-based methods (including advGAN [34] and
UEA [31]) use tremendous data to train a generator for
adding perturbations. The latter type is generally faster
than the former type because the operation for transform-
ing an image to an adversarial one does not need to be
repeated. In specific, FGSM [9] hypothesizes that neural
networks behave in very linear ways and proposes a “Fast
Gradient Sign Method” to attack them. Deepfool [21] gen-
erates adversarial examples by pushing data points around
the classification boundary past it with minimal perturba-
tions. AdvGAN [34] is the first work to generate adversar-
ial examples with GAN, which can run efficiently during
the inference phase. Recent research on adversarial attack
has extended from image classification to more challeng-
ing tasks, such as object detection. Two impressive works
are iterative-optimization-based DAG [35] and deep-model-
based UEA [31]. DAG [35] sets the difference of the classi-
fication score between adversarial and ground-truth classes
as its objective function, and then optimizes it using gra-
dient ascent. Although it achieves a high fooling rate, it
is time-consuming because several iterations are needed.
UEA [31] chooses GAN as a core component to generate
perturbations and trains the generator with a carefully de-
signed adversarial loss. UEA achieves comparative perfor-
mance but is much faster than DAG, because only one-time
forward propagation is needed during the inference phase
after training.
Adversarial objects in the physical world are more dif-
ficult to generate than digital adversarial examples because
the literature [19, 20] has revealed that adversarial exam-
ples generated by standard methods are not robust to the
common phenomena in the physical world, such as vary-
ing viewpoints and camera noises. To overcome this prob-
lem, the expectation over transformation (EOT) [1] method
requires not only the original single example but also its
augmented examples to be confusing. Combining with the
3D-printing technique, EOT can synthesize robust physi-
cal adversarial objects. Inheriting similar ideas, the method
in [26] generates adversarial eyeglasses that can fool state-
of-the-art face recognition systems, and the method in [32]
creates an inconspicuous poster that can deceive the simple
regression-based tracker GOTURN [11].
3. Cooling-Shrinking Attack
In this work, we propose an adversarial perturbation-
generator for deceiving the SiamRPN++ tracker. The goal
of our method is to make the target invisible to trackers,
thereby leading to tracking drift. To accomplish this goal,
we train the generator with a carefully designed and novel
cooling-shrinking loss. Considering that SiamRPN-based
trackers [16, 40, 15, 39, 30] locate the target in a local search
region based on the template given in the initial frame, we
design two versions of perturbation-generators to attack the
search regions and the template respectively.
3.1. Overview of SiamRPN++
So far, SiamRPN++ [15] is the most powerful
SiameseRPN-based tracker, achieving state-of-the-art per-
formance on almost all tracking datasets. The network ar-
chitecture of SiamRPN++ is shown in Figure 1. Given the
template T in the initial frame, SiamRPN++ detects target
in the search region SR from the current frame.
To be specific, the template is an image patch cropped in
the first frame, providing the target’s appearance informa-
tion for the tracker. The tracked target generally does not
move too much between two adjacent frames. Most modern
trackers only locate the target in a small search region cen-
tered in the position of the previous frame, rather than the
whole image. The size of the search region in the current
frame is proportional to the size of the target in the previous
frame. In each frame, the template T and search region SR
are first passed through a shared backbone network such as
ResNet50 [10], and their features are processed by some
non-shared neck layers and fused by depthwise correlation.
Based on these features, the RPN head layers predict the
classification mapsMC and regression mapsMR. Specifi-
cally, SiamRPN++ produces four regression factors, two of
which are related to the center offset and the other two are
responsible for the scale changes. Finally, the tracker con-
siders the position with the highest classification score as
the optimal target location, and then uses the correspond-
ing regression factors to obtain an accurate bounding box
as a result of the current frame. Thus, if the final classifica-
tion mapsMC or regression mapsMR are interfered, the
tracker may lose the ability to locate the target or produce
inaccurate results, leading to tracking failure.
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Figure 1. Network architecture of SiamRPN++ [15]. Better
viewed in color with zoom-in.
3.2. Overall Pipeline
Since the pipelines of attacking the template and at-
tacking the search regions are quite similar, we only dis-
cuss attacking search regions for simplicity. The over-
all pipeline of the training generator for attacking search
regions is shown in Figure 2. During the training pro-
cess, we first feed N pre-cropped unperturbed search re-
gions into the perturbation-generator, adding imperceptible
noises to them. Together with a clean template, these per-
turbed search regions are fed into the SiamRPN++ tracker’s
Siamese network, which produces adversarial classification
and regression maps of the corresponding search regions.
The SiamRPN++ tracker considers regions with the highest
response on the classification maps (heatmaps) as the target.
Thus, regions, where the tracked target exists on the adver-
sarial heatmaps, are expected to have low response values.
To indicate these regions, we also feed originally unper-
turbed search regions into the Siamese network, producing
clean heatmaps. Then, an adversarial cooling-shrinking loss
and anL2 loss are applied together to train our perturbation-
generator. The detailed training algorithm of the genera-
tor for attacking search regions is shown in Algorithm 1.
During the online-tracking phase, to deceive the tracker, we
only need to pass a clean search region into the generator,
obtaining a new adversarial one in each frame.
3.3. Cooling-Shrinking Loss
We propose a novel cooling-shrinking loss, composed of
the cooling loss LC for interfering the heatmaps MH and
Algorithm 1 Framework of training perturbation-generator
to attack search regions
Input: Rc: clean search regions; T c: clean template; g0:
randomly initialized generator
Output: trained generator g∗
1: Initialize generator g0. Initialize siamese model S and
freeze its parameters;
2: repeat
3: Get a clean template T c and a batch of clean search
regions Rc;
4: Feed T c into S;
5: Generate adversarial noises P = g(Rc) for Rc;
6: Get adversarial search regions Ra = Rc + P ;
7: Get adversarial heatmaps and regression maps
MaH ,M
a
R = S(R
a, T c) using Ra;
8: Get clean heatmaps M cH = S(R
c, T c);
9: Compute cooling loss LC and shrinking loss LS
based on MaH , M
a
R, M
c
H ;
10: Compute L2 loss L2 = 1N ||Ra −Rc||2;
11: Compute total loss L = α1LC + α2LS + α3L2;
12: Compute gradient of L to generator g’s parameters
and update with the Adam optimizer.
13: until model converges
+
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Figure 2. Network architecture of perturbation-generator for
search regions. Better viewed in color with zoom-in.
the shrinking loss LS for interfering the regression maps
MR. To determine the location of the target, we also in-
troduce the clean heatmaps M cH to the computation. In
specific, the cooling loss LC is designed to cool down hot
regions where the target may exist on the heatmaps, caus-
ing the tracker to lose the target. The shrinking loss LS
is designed to force the predicted bounding box to shrink,
leading to error accumulation and tracking failure. To com-
pute these two losses conveniently, we reshape the clean
heatmaps M cH , adversarial heatmaps M
a
H , and adversarial
regression maps MaR to 2D matrices M˜
c
H , M˜
a
H , M˜
a
R with
shape (N,2), (N,2), (N,4) respectively. Then, M˜ cH is acti-
vated with the softmax function, generating the probability
of target P+ and the probability of background P−. Based
on the probability P+ and a predefined threshold T , bi-
nary attention maps A are computed, indicating locations
that we are interested in. After that, we define the cooling
loss based on the difference between the confidence score
of positive class f+ and negative class f− on regions where
A > 0. We also set a margin mc in this loss to avoid any
unconstrained decrease of this loss, leading to difficulty in
controlling noises’ energy. Similarly, we set two scale fac-
tors Rw, Rh as the core of the shrinking loss and also set
margins mw and mh as we do in the cooling loss. The de-
tailed mathematical formulas about the cooling-shrinking
loss are shown in Algorithm 2. Figure 3 shows the effect of
the cooling-shrinking loss. The second row represents the
heatmaps produced by the clean template, and the third row
represents heatmaps produced by the adversarial template.
The adversarial heatmaps have low values on places where
the target exists, making the tracker difficult to locate the
tracked target. Figure 4 shows a comparison between the
original results and adversarial results. After adding adver-
sarial perturbations, the tracker becomes less scale-sensitive
(Figure 4(a)), less discriminative (Figure 4(b)), and less
target-aware (Figure 4(c)). To be specific, in Figure 4(a),
the tracker produces shrinking boxes when the target actu-
ally grows larger, causing inaccurate results. In Figure 4(b),
the tracker recognizes other distractors as the target. In ad-
dition, in Figure 4 (c), the tracker loses the target quickly
and can only re-capture it when it accidentally returns to
the previous location.
Algorithm 2 Cooling-Shrinking Loss
Input: M cH : clean heatmaps; MaH : adversarial heatmaps;
MaR: adversarial regression maps; T : threshold for
probability; mc: margin for classification; mw: mar-
gin for width regression factor; mh: margin for height
regression factor;
Output: cooling loss LC ; shrinking loss LS ;
1: Reshape M cH , M
a
H , M
a
R to 2D matrices: M˜
c
H , M˜
a
H ,
M˜aR;
2: P+, P− = softmax(M˜ cH);
3: A =
{
1 P+ ≥ T
0 P+ < T ;
4: f+, f− = M˜aH ∗ A;
5: Rx, Ry, Rw, Rh = M˜aR ∗ A;
6: LC =
1
Nmax(f+ − f−,mc);
7: LS =
1
Nmax(Rw,mw) +
1
Nmax(Rh,mh);
3.4. Implementation Details
Network Architectures: The perturbation-generator
adopts the U-Net [25] architecture, which achieves supe-
rior performance in many pixel-level tasks. U-Net first
downsamples feature maps multiple times and then up-
samples them accordingly to make the input size being a
power of 2, or the output size may mismatch with the in-
  
Figure 3. Search regions and their corresponding heatmaps. The
first row shows search regions. The second row represents clean
heatmaps generated by the clean template. The third row repre-
sents adversarial heatmaps generated by the adversarial template.
put size. In our experiment settings, the input resolution
also depends on whether to attack the template or search re-
gions. Specifically, all SiamRPN-based trackers, including
SiamRPN [16], DaSiamRPN [40], SiamRPN++ [15], and
SiamMask [30], adopt the same template size as 127× 127.
However, when working in long-term scenarios, they may
use different search region sizes like 255 × 255 and 831 ×
831, because of switching between local and global states.
Too large size may bring a heavy computational burden, and
too small size may cause the loss of detailed information.
Considering all these factors, we set the input resolution of
the generator as 128 × 128 for attacking the template and
512 × 512 for attacking the search regions. The gap be-
tween different resolutions is bridged by padding-cropping
or bilinear interpolation. For example, when attacking the
template, the original template with a spatial size 127×127
is first padded to 128 × 128 with zero and passed through
the generator to obtain the adversarial template. Then, the
adversarial template is cropped back to 127 × 127 again
and sent into the Siamese network. Similarly, when attack-
ing search regions, clean search regions with a spatial size
255×255 are first interpolated to 512×512 and fed into the
generator to get adversarial search regions. Then, adversar-
ial search regions are interpolated back to 255 × 255 again
and passed to the Siamese network.
Training Dataset: We use GOT-10K [12] as our training
set, to cover more types of the tracked target. To be spe-
cific, the GOT-10K dataset includes more than 10,000 se-
quences and more than 500 object classes, showing high
tracking diversity. We expect that models learned on this
dataset could have better generalization power rather than
only work on a few limited situations. We only use the train
split of GOT-10K and uniformly sample frames with an in-
terval of 10 frames, and then crop search regions from these
chosen frames. The template is cropped in the initial frame,
and each search region is cropped based on the groundtruth
of the last frame to simulate the situation in online track-
ing. In each training iteration, a template and N search
regions from the same video sequence are sent to our at-
tacking model. In our experiments, N is not larger than 15
due to the limited GPU memory.
Training Loss Function: The generator is trained with the
linear combination of the cooling loss, shrinking loss, and
L2 loss. The weights of these three losses can be tuned ac-
cording to different biases. For example, we can increase
the weight of the L2 loss or decrease that of adversarial
losses to make attack more unrecognizable. In our experi-
ment setting, we choose the weights of cooling loss, shrink-
ing loss and, L2 loss as 0.1, 1, and 500 respectively. The
three marginsmc,mw,mh for preventing the unconstrained
decrease of adversarial losses are all set to −5.
4. Experiments
In this work, we implement our algorithm with Py-
torch [23] deep learning framework. The hardware plat-
form is a PC machine with an intel-i9 CPU (64GB mem-
ory) and a RTX-2080Ti GPU (11GB memory). We evaluate
the proposed adversarial attack method on three datasets:
OTB100 [33], VOT2018 [14], and LaSOT [7]. To be spe-
cific, OTB100 [33] contains 100 sequences, providing a
fair benchmark for single object tracking. VOT2018 [14]
is another challenging tracking benchmark, which simul-
taneously measures the tracker’s accuracy and robustness.
This benchmark includes 60 videos and ranks the trackers’
performance with the expected average overlap (EAO) rule.
LaSOT [7] is a recent large-scale tracking dataset, which
covers 1400 videos with much longer time slots. We denote
SiamRPN++ as SiamRPNpp for concise descriptions in the
experiment section. Numerous experimental results demon-
strate that our method can fool the state-of-the-art SiamRP-
Npp tracker with merely imperceptible perturbations on the
search regions or template. We also test our perturbation-
generator on another three top-performance trackers: DaSi-
amRPN [40], DaSiamRPN-UpdateNet [37], and DiMP [3].
Obvious performance drop can also be observed, which
shows that our method has good transferability. The speed
of our attacking algorithm is also extremely fast. It only
takes our model less than 9 ms to transform a clean search
region to the adversarial one, and less than 3 ms to trans-
form a clean template to the adversarial one.
4.1. Adversarial Attack to SiamRPNpp
Attacking Search Regions Only: When attacking search
regions, we leave the original template unchanged and only
replace clean search regions with the adversarial ones in
each frame. The detailed experimental results are shown in
Table 1, and an obvious performance drop can be observed
on all three datasets.
Attacking the Template Only: When attacking the tem-
plate, we only perturb the template once in the initial frame,
replacing the original template with the adversarial one, and
      
(a) CarScale (b) Bolt (c) Doll
Figure 4. Illustration of the effectiveness of generated perturbations. The green, blue and red boxes represent the groundtruth, original
results and adversarial results, respectively. The blue and red lines represent the IoU’s variation of the original results and adversarial
results over time, respectively. Better viewed in color with zoom-in.
Table 1. Effect of attacking search regions. The third column rep-
resents SiamRPNpp’s original results. The fourth column repre-
sents results produced by attacking search regions. The last col-
umn represents the performance drop.
Dataset Metric Original Attack SR Drop
OTB100 Success(↑) 0.696 0.349 0.347Precision(↑) 0.914 0.491 0.423
VOT2018
Accuracy(↑) 0.600 0.486 0.114
Robustness(↓) 0.234 2.074 1.840
EAO(↑) 0.414 0.073 0.341
LaSOT Norm Precision(↑) 0.569 0.219 0.350Success(↑) 0.496 0.180 0.316
then leaving the rest of the tracking process undisturbed.
The detailed experimental results are shown in Table 2. The
performance drop in this scenario is not as much as that in
attacking search regions, because the tracker is hard to de-
ceive by only adding minimal noises to the initial template.
Table 2. Effect of attacking the template. The third column repre-
sents SiamRPNpp’s original results. The fourth column represents
results produced by attacking the template. The last column rep-
resents the performance drop.
Dataset Metric Original Attack T Drop
OTB100 Success(↑) 0.696 0.527 0.169Precision(↑) 0.914 0.713 0.201
VOT2018
Accuracy(↑) 0.600 0.541 0.059
Robustness(↓) 0.234 1.147 0.913
EAO(↑) 0.414 0.123 0.291
LaSOT Norm Precision(↑) 0.569 0.448 0.121Success(↑) 0.496 0.393 0.103
Attacking Both Search Regions and the Template: We
also design a strategy that simultaneously attacks both
search regions and the template. In this setting, we use the
same generator designed for search regions to interfere with
the template and search regions together. The detailed re-
sults are shown in Table 3. It can be seen that this strategy
brings a slightly higher performance drop than only attack-
ing search regions.
Table 3. Effect of attacking both search regions and the template.
The third column represents SiamRPNpp’s original results. The
fourth column represents results produced by attacking both search
regions and the template. The last column represents the perfor-
mance drop.
Dataset Metric Original Attack Both Drop
OTB100 Success(↑) 0.696 0.324 0.372Precision(↑) 0.914 0.471 0.443
VOT2018
Accuracy(↑) 0.600 0.467 0.133
Robustness(↓) 0.234 2.013 1.779
EAO(↑) 0.414 0.073 0.341
LaSOT Norm Precision(↑) 0.569 0.201 0.368Success(↑) 0.496 0.168 0.328
We also compare the performance of SiamRPNpp [15]
and its adversarial variants: SiamRPNpp+AT (attacking
template), SiamRPNpp+AS (attacking search regions), and
SiamRPNpp+ATS (attacking template and search regions)
with other state-of-the-art trackers, such as MDNet [22],
ECO [5], SPLT [36], VITAL [27], StructSiam [38], and
SiamFC [2]. The results are shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Our adversarial attack algorithm drops the performance of
SiamRPNpp significantly, making it obviously inferior to
other top-performance trackers.
4.2. Ablation Study
Influence of Shrinking Loss: We discuss the influence of
the shrinking loss on the adversarial success rate in different
situations. As explained before, the cooling loss is used to
attack the classification branch, making the target invisible
to the tracker. In addition, the shrinking loss is designed
to disable the tracker’s ability of scale estimation, thereby
forcing the tracker to predict inaccurate bounding boxes.
To explore the effect of the shrinking loss, we design three
groups of comparison experiments on OTB100 [33] and La-
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Figure 5. Quantitative comparison of state-of-the-art trackers on
the LaSOT dataset.
  
Figure 6. Quantitative analysis of different attributes on the
VOT2018 dataset.
SOT [7]: G-Template vs. G-Template-Regress, G-Search
vs. G-Search-Regress, and G-Template-Search vs. G-
Template-Search-Regress. The detailed results are shown
in Figure 7 and Figure 8. The shrinking loss does play a sig-
nificant part when attacking search regions only and when
attacking both search regions and template, bringing obvi-
ous extra performance drop. However, the shrinking loss
also plays a negative part when attacking the template only,
because it may cause the misclassification task to be sub-
optimal. To be specific, it is much more difficult to deceive
the tracker by only perturbing template once than perturbing
search regions in all frames. Thus, the generator cannot eas-
ily balance between cooling loss and L2 loss when attack-
ing only the template. Adding an extra shrinking loss may
lead to serious difficulty in training, causing worse attack-
ing performance. In summary, the shrinking loss is helpful
to attack search regions but somewhat harmful to attack the
template.
Influence of a Discriminator: We also discuss the influ-
ence of a discriminator. Most previous neural-network-
based adversarial attack methods [34, 31] adopt GAN struc-
ture, using a discriminator to supervise the adversarial out-
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Figure 7. Quantitative comparisons between w/ and w/o shrinking
loss on the OTB100 dataset. Results with the suffix ”Regress” are
ones with shrinking loss.
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Figure 8. Quantitative comparisons between w/ and w/o shrinking
loss on the LaSOT dataset. Results with the suffix ”Regress” are
ones with shrinking loss.
put of the generator to be similar to the original input. How-
ever, we argue that the discriminator is not necessary. The
reason why the L2 loss and discriminator are applied is that
we expect the perturbed image and original image to look
similar. In other words, we hope that the perturbation is
imperceptible. The L2 loss can directly restrict the energy
of noises and can be easily optimized. However, for the
GAN’s structure, the evolution of generator and discrimina-
tor has to be synchronized, which is hard to guarantee es-
pecially when the generator has many other tasks to learn.
Thus, considering the instability of the GAN’s architec-
ture, we discard the discriminator and train the perturbation-
generator only with the cooling-shrinking loss and L2 loss.
The visualization of clean and adversarial templates from
the VOT2018 dataset is shown in Figure 9. Without the
help of a discriminator, the perturbation generated by our
method is also quite imperceptible.
4.3. Further Discussions
Speed: Our method also has extremely high efficiency.
When attacking search regions, our method only needs less
than 9 ms to process a frame, running in more than 100
FPS. When attacking the template, our method needs less
than 3ms to process a whole video sequence. The speed
of our algorithm is much faster than that of common video
flow and that of most real-time trackers, indicating that it is
also imperceptible in terms of time consumption.
Noise Pattern: The adversarial search regions, the clean
ones and their difference maps are shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 9. Visualization of clean and perturbed templates of the
VOT2018 dataset. Better viewed in color with zoom-in.
It can be seen that the perturbation mainly focuses on the
tracked target, leaving other regions almost not perturbed.
  
Figure 10. Adversarial search regions, clean ones and their dif-
ference maps. To observe pattern of difference maps clearly, the
differences have been magnified by 10 times.
Comparasion with Other Noises: As shown in Figure 11
and Table 4, compared with impulse noises and gauss
noises, our adversarial perturbation is far more impercep-
tible but causes much larger performance drop.
impulseprob=0.1 impulseprob=0.2 gausssigma=0.1 gausssigma=0.2oursadversarialoriginalsearch
MAE=0.98 MAE=12.72 MAE=25.61 MAE=19.76 MAE=37.47
Figure 11. Search regions with different kinds of noises. MAE
represents mean absolute error.
Table 4. Comparison with other kinds of noises.
Dataset Metric original ours impulse 0.1 impulse 0.2 gauss 0.1 gauss 0.2
OTB100 Success(↑) 0.696 0.349 0.486 0.389 0.553 0.389Precision(↑) 0.914 0.491 0.656 0.535 0.727 0.542
VOT2018 EAO(↑) 0.414 0.073 0.117 0.084 0.170 0.108
Transferability: All aforementioned experiments are based
on the SiamRPNpp [15] tracker. To test our method’s trans-
ferability, we also apply our trained perturbation-generator
to another three state-of-the-art trackers: DaSiamRPN [40],
DaSiamRPN-UpdateNet [37], and DiMP [3]. Although all
these trackers have templates and search regions, they are
quite different from SiamRPNpp. To be specific, compared
with SiamRPNpp, DaSiamRPN adopts a simpler backbone.
DaSiamRPN-UpdateNet proposes a learnable way to up-
date the template, further improving DaSiamRPN’s per-
formance. DiMP uses an online discriminative model to
roughly determine the location of the target on the search
region, and then applies a state estimation module to pre-
dict precise bounding boxes. We use these three trackers
as the baseline algorithms and then add perturbations to
their search region in each frame. We make experiments on
the LaSOT [7] dataset. The detailed results about attacking
DaSiamRPN, DaSiamRPN-UpdateNet, DiMP are shown in
Table 5. Although our attacking algorithm is designed for
and trained with SiamRPNpp, this method can also effec-
tively deceive other state-of-the-art trackers, causing obvi-
ous performance drop, which demonstrates the transferabil-
ity of our attacking method.
Table 5. Adversarial effect on other state-of-the-art trackers.
From top to bottom, three trackers are DaSiamRPN, DaSi-
amRPN+UpdateNet and DiMP.
Tracker Success(↑) Norm Precision(↑)
DaSiamRPN
Original 0.458 0.544
Adversarial 0.400 0.479
Drop 0.058 0.065
UpdateNet
Original 0.465 0.549
Adversarial 0.399 0.478
Drop 0.066 0.071
DiMP50
Original 0.559 0.642
Adversarial 0.492 0.567
Drop 0.067 0.075
5. Conclusion
In this study, we present an effective and efficient adver-
sarial attacking algorithm for deceiving single object track-
ers. A novel cooling-shrinking loss is proposed to train
the perturbation-generator. The generator trained with this
adversarial loss and L2 loss can deceive SiamRPN++ at
a high success rate with imperceptible noises. We show
that a discriminator is not necessary in adversarial attack
of the tracker because the combination of the adversarial
loss and L2 loss has already achieved our goal. Besides
SiamRPN++, our attacking method has impressive transfer-
ability and effectively attacks other recent trackers such as
DaSiamRPN, DaSiamRPN-UpdateNet, and DiMP. Our al-
gorithm is also quite efficient and can transform clean tem-
plates/search regions to adversarial ones in a short time in-
terval.
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